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II   Abstract 
This paper is a critique of New Zealand’s criminal justice system as it existed in the 1970s. 
Through an analysis of the Arthur Allan Thomas trials, in which the courts failed to 
produce a just result, it will demonstrate how the system was crippled by three of its major 
components; the prosecution, the judiciary and the jury. While acknowledging the 
prominent roles played by the defence and the police in the Thomas case, they will not be 
the focus of this paper. After setting out the chronology of appeals and proceedings that 
lead up to Thomas’ royal pardon, this paper will go on to explain why the criminal justice 
system was ineffective. It will do so by unravelling the systematic bias and unethical 
practice that occurred within the prosecution and the judiciary. Lastly, it will illustrate the 
adverse effect such practices had on the impartiality of jurors. 
Keywords: Arthur Allan Thomas, New Zealand criminal justice system, 1970s 
 
III   Introduction 
The New Zealand criminal justice system operates on various protection mechanisms 
intended to prevent unjust outcomes. These include the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, the onus of proof on the prosecution and rules 
regulating lawyers’ conduct.1 During the 1970s, these safeguards either did not exist in 
their current form or were not always complied with. This paper critiques the state of the 
criminal justice system during that period by exposing the flaws within three major 
components of the court system. It will do so through an analysis of the Arthur Allan 
Thomas trials. 
The prosecution of Arthur Allan Thomas is one of the most controversial cases in New 
Zealand’s contemporary legal history. The case triggered a significant shift in the 
country’s perception of the criminal justice system. When the 1980 Commission of Inquiry 
revealed a critical piece of evidence was planted by the police,2 public confidence in law 
enforcement diminish dramatically. The police played a key role in securing a conviction 
                                                          
1 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008; and “Solicitor-General’s 
Prosecution Guidelines 2013” (28 June 2013) Crown Law Office 
<http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/artman/docs/cat_index_13.asp>. 
2 Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Circumstances of the Convictions of Arthur Allan 
Thomas for the Murders of David Harvey Crewe and Jeanette Lenore Crewe (PD Hasselberg, Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1980) at [350]. 
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and police corruption is the aspect of the case most vividly remembered today. However, 
Thomas’ ten year struggle for justice also resulted from deficiencies within the 
prosecution, the judiciary and the jury. The failure of the courts to produce a just result 
was also subject to widespread criticism. This paper focuses on the conduct of these three 
components of the adversarial court system during the Thomas trials. For the purposes of 
this paper the actions of the defence will not be analysed.  
The available sources reveal that during the course of the two Supreme Court trials, the 
prosecution appeared to show a greater interest in obtaining a conviction than producing a 
just result. It manipulated evidence and used unethical tactics to ensure the preservation of 
a guilty verdict. The judges were allegedly pro-prosecution and stubbornly stood beside 
their verdict in spite of the evidence. Furthermore, there was a real likelihood the influence 
of the judiciary and the prosecution deprived Thomas of the right to an impartial jury. 
Regrettably, there are few sources available in defence of the system. This may be due to 
the fear of attracting strong public backlash or because the system was largely 
indefensible.  
IV   Setting the Scene 
On 17 June 1970, Harvey and Jeannette Crewe were murdered in their Pukekawa 
farmhouse.3 Their bodies were later discovered in the Waikato River, both with a .22 
bullet to the head.4 Having examined a modest collection of 64 rifles against the recovered 
bullet fragments, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) concluded 
only two rifles could not be excluded as having shot the fatal bullets; one of which 
belonged to local farmer Arthur Allan Thomas.5 Adding to this his affection for Jeannette 
in the past, Thomas became the prime suspect in the police investigation. The discovery of 
a cartridge case (exhibit 350) in an allegedly unsearched flowerbed on the Crewe farm 
marked the tipping point of the case against Thomas. The DSIR established that exhibit 
350 belonged to his rifle and it was this piece of planted evidence that lead to Thomas’ 
arrest in November 1970.6  
                                                          
3 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [436]. 
4 At [54]. 
5 “Crown Case in Crewe Murder Trial” The New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 16 February 1971) at 5. 
6 David Yallop Beyond Reasonable Doubt? (Hodder and Stoughton, Auckland, 1978) at 76. 
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The first trial ended on 2 March 1971 with a guilty verdict on both counts; Thomas was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Harvey and Jeannette Crewe.7 An appeal 
against the conviction was dismissed.8 In response to several petitions, the case was 
reviewed by former Supreme Court judge Sir George McGregor. In February 1972, 
McGregor produced a report advising against a new trial.9 The ‘Arthur Allan Thomas 
Retrial Committee’ was tenacious in its efforts to have Thomas acquitted. In August 1972, 
it was successful in its application to have the case referred to the Court of Appeal,10 and 
on 26 February 1973 the Court ordered a second trial.11  
The second trial began on 26 March and the jury delivered its verdict on 16 April 1973. 
Yet again, Thomas was found guilty of double murder.12 An outcry erupted in the public 
gallery with some individuals banging on windows and others chanting in anger. A furious 
crowd could still be found screaming outside the Supreme Court an hour after the 
conviction.13 It was evident that a cynicism towards the criminal justice system was 
developing in New Zealand.  
On 11 July 1973, the case came before the Court of Appeal on grounds of unfair conduct 
by the prosecutor.14  For reasons discussed later, this appeal was dismissed. In 1974, two 
questions were referred to the Court of Appeal relating to new evidence on exhibit 350.15 
This too was dismissed and an application to the Privy Council in 1978 appealing this 
decision was refused.16 Defence counsel contended that the Court of Appeal erred in law 
in its interpretation of the onus of proof, but the Privy Council advised that it had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.17 The main focus of this paper will be on the 1971 and 
1973 Supreme Court (now the High Court) trials. 
                                                          
7 “Thomas Sentenced To Life Imprisonment For Farm Murders” The New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 3 
March 1971) at 4. 
8 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [23].  
9 At [24]. 
10 Yallop, above n 6, at 207. 
11 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [24]. 
12 “Jury Find Thomas Guilty of Crewe Murders” The New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 17 April 1973) at 3. 
13 Gabriel David “Mass Hysteria Erupts when Guilty Verdict Delivered” The Evening Post (Wellington, 17 
April 1973) at 11. 
14 R v Thomas (No 2) [1974] 1 NZLR 658 (CA). 
15 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [27]. 
16 R v Thomas [1978] 2 NZLR 1 (PC). 
17 At 8. 
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It was apparent to a large portion of the country that the case against Thomas was 
flawed.18 Yet, after exhausting what seemed like every avenue of the criminal justice 
system, Thomas was still no closer to an acquittal. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was 
one of many with reservations about the outcome, feeling the prosecution had not proven 
Thomas’ guilt to the mandatory standard. In his opinion, both juries were not presented 
with sufficient evidence to find Thomas guilty beyond reasonable doubt.19  
Following the publication of David Yallop’s book in 1978, Muldoon took the matter to 
cabinet recommending an independent inquiry into the case. The product was a report by 
Robert Adams-Smith QC which contained serious criticisms of the evidence used against 
Thomas and raised doubts about the satisfaction of the standard of proof.20 Consequently, 
on 17 December 1979, acting on the recommendation of Minister of Justice Jim McLay, 
the Governor-General exercised his royal prerogative. Thomas was granted a free pardon 
pursuant to s 407 of the Crimes Act 1961, leading to his release that year.21  
In 1980 a Royal Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) was established to inquire into 
the circumstances of the two convictions and to determine the quantum of Thomas’ 
compensation.22 This body utilised an inquisitorial process as opposed to the adversarial 
system used by the New Zealand courts.23 It was not until then a wrongful conviction was 
finally recognised. 
 
V   The Prosecution 
Appearing for the Crown in both trials were two highly competent prosecutors, David 
Morris and David Baragwanath.24 As for Thomas, he had the robust representation of 
accomplished defence lawyers Paul Temm QC in 1971,25 and Kevin Ryan in 1973.26 The 
presence of equally proficient counsel arguing for either side ought to produce a just result. 
However, reality demonstrated that this may only represent the baseline of what is required 
                                                          
18 See “Angry Crowd Reaction to Verdict Scares Jury” The New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 17 April 1973) 
at 1; and “They Believe in Thomas’s Innocence” The Evening Post (Wellington, 29 August 1973) at 8. 
19 Robert Muldoon My Way (Reed, Wellington, 1981) at 144. 
20 At 145. 
21 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [29]. 
22 Barry Gustafson His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2000) 
at 291. 
23 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [486]. 
24 “Crown Case in Crewe Murder Trial”, above n 5, at 5. 
25 At 5. 
26 “Isolation Order For Jury in Thomas Trial” The New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 27 March 1973) at 3. 
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to establish true equality of arms. In a number of aspects, the prosecution had secured 
noticeable advantages over the defence. 
A   The Desire for Conviction 
It is a well-established principle of legal practice that prosecutors are first and foremost 
officers of the court or “ministers of justice”.27 Rather than solely acting in the interests of 
a particular party, prosecutors owe a wider duty to assist the court in ascertaining the truth 
and securing justice. The notion that prosecutors must not “struggle for a conviction” 
emerged in the early 19th century, and was authoritatively reaffirmed in R v Puddick.28 The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in its 1973 decision referred to this case with approval.29 
However, the Court added that prosecutors must be as firm as the circumstances 
necessitate to present a fair and complete case.30  
The principle can now be found in the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct 
and Client Care) Rules 2008 and the Solicitor General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013. 
These two documents state that prosecutors shall perform their obligations impartially. 
They must avoid arousing prejudice or bias against the defendant, and present their case 
dispassionately and without inflammatory language.31 The guidelines also endorse the 
Court of Appeal’s 1973 position, permitting prosecutors to act as strong advocates 
prosecuting their case “forcefully in a firm and vigorous manner.”32  
In spite of the prosecutor’s role as an impartial officer of the court, by the arrival of the 
second trial a strong desire for conviction was allegedly shared by both the police and the 
prosecution.33  Since the first trial, the circumstances had changed dramatically. Sunday 
News columnist Odette Leather observed that “[t]he trial of Arthur Thomas has ended, but 
in its stead a strange new trial has begun. The defendant in this instance is ‘the system’.”34  
By 1973 the entire criminal justice system had been vilified. This included the judge, the 
police, and prosecutors Morris and Baragwanath. The integrity of those constituting the 
                                                          
27 David Plater “The development of the Role of the Prosecuting Lawyer in the Criminal Process: ‘Partisan 
Persecutor’ to ‘Minister of Justice’” (2006) ANZLH E-Journal 1 at 3. 
28 At 11. 
29 R v Thomas No. 2, above n 14, at 659. 
30 At 659. 
31 Lawyers and conveyancers Act (lawyers: conduct and client care) rules 2008 (SR 2008/214), above n 1, 
r13.12; and “Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines”, above n 1, at 19.3. 
32At 19.3. 
33 Kevin Ryan Justice: Without Fear or Favour (Hodder Moa Beckett, Auckland, 1997) at 135. 
34 Yallop, above n 6, at 202. 
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system was under “extraordinary attack.”35 As a result, the desire for conviction was 
supposedly “very deep” and “very personal.”36 Such a desire can be perceived through the 
prosecution’s close collaboration with the police,37 excessive collation of juror-related 
information,38 heavy angling of evidence during cross-examination,39 the wrongful use of 
the subpoena,40 and its part in destroying important exhibits in 1973.41 Muldoon 
acknowledged this desire, but was sympathetic to those striving for a conviction:42 
There is no doubt that, once they decided that Thomas was the murderer, the 
police used every trick in the book to have him convicted, and they were 
successful. This is not a criticism of the police. They have a tough job in 
getting convictions of people who are undoubtedly guilty and they constantly 
face defence lawyers who also use every trick in the book. In the Thomas case, 
the police were so keen to get a conviction that they actually used a mobile 
command post stationed outside the Supreme Court… 
B   Preferential treatment 
The difference in treatment received by counsel gave the prosecution an edge. Kevin Ryan, 
representing Thomas in the second trial, recalled the marked lack of courtesy and 
deliberate denigration of defence counsel and defence witnesses by the Department of 
Justice and certain police officers.43 While the prosecutors were perceived as comrades of 
the Department, the defence was demonised. Preferential treatment was not limited to 
mere niceties. The relationship between the prosecution and the police could be construed 
as a partnership while there was little incentive for the police to aid the defence. As a 
result, there was a major disparity in the resources available to both sides.44  
The prosecution had at its disposal the entire police force to facilitate the process of 
analysing and gathering evidence. Throughout the second trial, a police caravan was 
parked outside the Supreme Court in which officers monitored the case as it progressed.45 
                                                          
35 Yallop, above n 6, at 217. 
36 Ryan, above n 33, at 135. 
37 “Verdict in Thomas Trial Expected Today After Summing up by Judge” The New Zealand Herald 
(Auckland, 16 April 1973) at 3. 
38 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [463]. 
39 Pat Booth The Fate of Arthur Thomas: Trial By Ambush (South Pacific Press, Auckland, 1975) at 99. 
40 Yallop, above n 6, at 116. 
41 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [402]. 
42 Muldoon, above n 19, at 144. 
43 Ryan, above n 33, at 135. 
44 At 135. 
45 Yallop, above n 6, at 222. 
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Detective Inspector Bruce Hutton revealed that its purpose was to assist the prosecution by 
carefully scrutinising the evidence and the arguments made by the defence. Officers were 
swiftly dispatched to acquire evidence detrimental to Thomas’ case.46  
On the other hand, the defence was not so well-equipped. During his opening address, 
Ryan noted that the defence “did not have the money nor the means nor the power to be 
able to do the same preparation”.47 He went on to say, “I do not think that when a person 
challenges the State, as happened in this particular case, that they start off equal.”48 This 
was not a comment on the skills of counsel or the cost of specialist fees, but the unfair 
level of assistance the prosecution received from the police department: “when you are in 
this Court you can’t chase around looking for witnesses. You can’t have a caravan placed 
by the Court and plugged in, like the police.”49  
C   Unethical Tactics 
Competition is inherent in an adversarial system. The system relies on a degree of rivalry 
between counsel to ensure all possibilities are presented and meticulously analysed. In a 
wide sense, in advocating for their respective parties, counsel are essentially cooperating to 
ascertain the truth. However, the practical reality of an adversarial system is that the result 
is not determined by who can present the best case based on the evidence, but rather which 
lawyer is better at employing tactics. The danger of using tactics in court is that they may 
serve the function of shrouding the truth rather than exposing it.50  
The subpoena, a device used to compel witnesses to give evidence in court, was used as a 
pre-trial tactic. The prosecution abused the power of subpoena by using it for a different 
purpose, that is, to prevent defence counsel from interviewing certain witnesses before the 
trial.51 Peter Thomas, Thomas’ cousin, had been living with Thomas and his wife. He was 
an important witness for the defence as he insisted the accused had never left the farm the 
night the Crewes were murdered. Temm was prevented from interviewing him before the 
first trial as Peter Thomas had been subpoenaed by the Crown. Subpoenas were also 
served on Bruce Roddick and other key witnesses, though the prosecution never intended 
                                                          
46 Yallop, above n 6, at 223. 
47 “Verdict in Thomas Trial Expected Today After Summing up by Judge”, above n 37, at 3. 
48 At 3. 
49 At 3. 
50 R J Gerber “Victory v Truth: The Adversary System and its Ethics” (1987) 19 Ariz St LJ 3 at 4. 
51 Yallop, above n 6, at 116. 
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to call on them.52 This hindered the defence’s ability to gather evidence and properly 
prepare its case for trial. Other tactics employed by the prosecution included the selective 
presentation of facts and the suppression of evidence. By withholding material that was of 
value to the defence, the prosecution was able to construct a set of facts most favourable to 
the Crown case. This is discussed below. 
D   The Prosecution and the Evidence 
There are four major issues pertaining to the way the prosecution handled evidence prior 
to, during, and after the trials. More specifically, its selective presentation of facts, lack of 
disclosure, skewing of evidence, and destruction of evidence. 
1   The Selective Presentation of Facts 
The efficacy of the adversarial system is contingent on the jury making an informed 
decision; this must involve hearing all the evidence. A major criticism of the prosecution 
was its selective presentation of facts. For example, Morris relied on Thomas’ retention of 
an old letter from Jeannette as proof of Thomas’ continuing obsession and “passion” 53 for 
her.54 The prosecution chose not to reveal that Thomas had produced this letter to the 
police of his own volition and also kept a number of letters written to him by other woman 
around the same time.55 In breach of disclosure obligations, these letters were withheld 
during the first and second trial.56 
The considerable body of evidence for Thomas’ innocence was not heard by either of the 
juries.57  This is because the defence was deprived of the opportunity to present its case 
fully. The lack of appreciation given to the rules on disclosure and the disparity in 
resources made it difficult for Temm and Ryan to strike back. The police in aid of the 
prosecution deliberately suppressed any evidence favourable to the defence.  
One witness relayed to the police that she heard gun shots coming from the Crewe farm on 
the 17 June, at a time that suggested the Crewes were murdered before Thomas and his 
family had gone to bed.58 This was dismissed by the police along with evidence indicating 
                                                          
52 Yallop, above n 6, at 116. 
53 “Women Witness at Murder Trial Says Thomas Had ‘Passion’ For Jeanette Crewe” The New Zealand 
Herald (Auckland, 29 March 1973) at 3. 
54 Booth, above n 39, at 168. 
55 At 104. 
56 At 168. 
57 At 17. 
58 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [417]. 
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a potential “clean up” that took place on the Crewe farm; sparks and emissions were seen 
coming from the farm two days after the murder at a time when the Thomas’ were out of 
town.59 This evidence supported the defence case as it indicated someone else may have 
been responsible for the deaths of the Crewes. However, the defence was not informed. In 
fairness, though the conduct of the police was in aid of the prosecution, there is no 
evidence suggesting Morris was aware of these matters.60  
2   The Disclosure of Evidence 
Under s 13 of the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, the prosecution has a continuing 
obligation to fully disclose any information with a material bearing on the defendant’s 
case. This information, which includes the names and addresses of material witnesses 
interviewed by the prosecution,61 should be given to the defence as soon as reasonably 
practicable.62 A comprehensive regime on the discovery of documents did not exist in 
New Zealand at the time of the two trials. This is not to say there were no rules on 
disclosure at all. The Police General Instruction C143 stated: 63  
“When Police decide not to call a person as a witness for the Prosecution, the 
Defence should be advised of the name and address of the person so that, if 
desired, the person can be called as a witness for the Defence. This instruction, 
however, applies only to a person who is able to give material evidence 
(particularly when favourable to accused), and not a person who because he is 
unable to give any material evidence is not being called.” 
When the first trial took place in 1971, Halsbury’s Laws of England contained a basic 
statement of law which was accepted by the Commission as applicable in New Zealand at 
the time: 64 
“When the Prosecution have taken a statement from a person who can give 
material evidence, but decided not to call him, they must make him available as 
a witness for the Defence, but need not supply the Defence with a copy of the 
statement they have taken.” 
                                                          
59 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [433]. 
60 At [412] and [434]. 
61 Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, s 13(3). 
62 Section 13(1). 
63 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [412]. 
64 Viscount Simonds (ed) Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed, Butterworths, London, 1952 to 1964) vol 10 
at [765] as cited in Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [414]. 
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This was further clarified in 1975 in the case of R v Mason. Moller J held that where the 
police have interviewed a person with evidence on a material subject, “whether the 
prosecution considers him creditworthy or not, it must make his name and address 
available to the defence.”65 
Had these requirements for disclosure been strictly followed or existed in their current 
statutory form, the police and prosecution would not have been able to get away with 
selectively presenting evidence. Full disclosure would have ensured any information 
withheld by the prosecution and the police could be provided to the jury by defence 
counsel; allowing jurors to deliver an informed verdict and thus ensuring Thomas’ rights to 
a fair trial. 
3   The Skewing of Evidence 
Closely connected with its selective use of facts was the way the prosecution heavily 
angled the evidence in utter disregard for the truth during cross-examination. This is the 
nature of circumstantial evidence; its flexibility allows for broad interpretation. Morris 
claimed that when Thomas and Jeannette both resided in Maramarua, Thomas had pestered 
her to the point she abandoned her teaching course and travelled to Wanganui to get away 
from him.66 This supported allegations of Thomas’ enduring passion.67 The truth was that 
Jeannette had never been a permanent member of staff at Maramarua School and there was 
no course for her to complete. Upon inquiry the headmaster revealed that “no one had ever 
sought this information.”68 Jeannette had real incentives to move to Wanganui as her best 
friend resided there and she was also offered a permanent teaching position,69 but it was 
not in the interests of the prosecution to acquire this information. 
Exhibit 350 was the critical piece of evidence buttressing the Crown’s case. There was no 
doubt that the cartridge was fired from Thomas’ rifle;70 thus, it placed him directly on the 
Crewe farm with a loaded weapon. However, Dr Jim Sprott, expert witness for the 
defence, made a discovery that endangered the narrative created by the prosecution. Dr 
Sprott revealed that there were small, but noticeable incongruences between the lettering 
on the base of exhibit 350, and the lettering on cartridges capable of containing one of the 
                                                          
65 R v Mason [1975] 2 NZLR 289 (SC) at 292. 
66 Booth, above n 39, at 98. 
67 “Women Witness at Murder Trial Says Thomas Had ‘Passion’ For Jeanette Crewe”, above n 53, at 3. 
68 Booth, above n 39, at  99. 
69 At 100. 
70 Yallop, above n 6, at 76. 
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pattern 8 bullets retrieved from the bodies.71 This inconsistency strongly suggested that the 
cartridge case connecting Thomas to the murders had been planted.  
Morris attempted to discredit this discovery using expert witnesses to confuse the jury 
rather than to provide reliable empirical evidence. Dr Donald Nelson, lead scientist for the 
prosecution, allegedly gave false evidence that the two cartridges were identical.72 In 
October 1973, Inspector Hutton and Dr Nelson attempted to pressure George Leighton, 
who was responsible for engraving the head stamps for the ICI, into swearing a false 
affidavit.73 Leighton refused to sign it as the affidavit incorrectly stated that the ICI head 
stamps he produced were identical with no differences in the lettering of each batch. The 
Commission found that the differences in the categories of cartridge cases could be 
discerned by the naked eye,74 and was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that exhibit 350 
contained a pattern 18 or 19 bullet, not a pattern 8 bullet.75 The Commission stipulated that 
there is a fundamental obligation on expert witnesses acting for the Crown to “tell the 
whole truth in the interests of justice”, regardless of whether the evidence assists the 
Crown or the defence.76 Critical of the draft affidavit prepared for Leighton by Dr Nelson, 
the Commission stated: 77 
“This incident is indicative of a tendency on the part of Dr Nelson, manifested 
in other areas in far more serious ways, to shape the evidence to fit his own 
theories rather than to shape, and if necessary abandon his own theories in the 
light of the evidence.” 
4   The Destruction of Evidence 
After the second trial, Morris advised Inspector Hutton to dispose of the exhibits, including 
exhibit 350.78 The police disposed of them on the Whitford tip on 27 July 1973.79 As a 
result, in 1975, when the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal, the Court was 
                                                          
71 Booth, above 39, at 154. 
72 Peter Williams QC, The Dwarf who Moved and Other Remarkable Tales from a Life in the Law (Harper 
Collins, Auckland, 2014) at 177. 
73 At 176. 
74 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [99]. 
75 At [97]. 
76 At [160]. 
77 At [120]. 
78 Yallop, above n 6, at 280. 
79 At 280. 
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deprived of the opportunity to physically examine the cartridge case. Fortunately, there 
remained a series of photographs on which counsel could rely.80  
The Commission deemed the disposal of the evidence to be “an improper action designed 
to prevent any further investigation of exhibit 350.”81 Before the result of the appeal in 
1973 was determined, in an interview with Morris, Booth informed him that Thomas and 
his supporters intended to continue the fight for Thomas’ freedom.82 The exhibits were 
valuable to the defence and their existence was a threat to the prosecution’s case.83 
Although it was normal practice to dispose of exhibits after an appeal, the Commission 
considered that “enough had been said, seen and done” to make it clear to the prosecution 
that the exhibits continued to be of use and should have been returned to Thomas or 
defence counsel.84  
The Court of Appeal dismissed the 1975 appeal, finding that the defence had not excluded 
a reasonable possibility that exhibit 350 contained a pattern 8 bullet.85 Peter Williams QC 
was critical of the decision, contending that the Court misinterpreted the onus of proof.86 
Minister of Justice Dr Martyn Finlay shared this sentiment, stating that: 87 
“…the burden of proof was not in accordance with my understanding of the 
law. I felt that they had put the burden of proof on Thomas rather than the 
Crown. I was astounded by the decision.” 
As the following section illustrates, this was not the extent of anomalous decision-making 
by the judiciary. 
 
VI   The Judiciary 
The judiciary is supposed to be independent and strictly impartial.88 Under an adversarial 
system the function of a judge at a jury trial is to act as a neutral referee overseeing court 
proceedings.89 A review of the 1970s criminal justice system as reflected through the 
                                                          
80 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [63]. 
81 At [402]. 
82 At [363]. 
83 At [364]. 
84 At [364]. 
85 At [29]. 
86 Williams, above n 71, at 178. 
87 Yallop, above n 6, at 289. 
88 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at 21.3.1. 
89 At 8.2.3. 
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Thomas trials, requires an analysis of the judiciary and its purported bias towards the 
prosecution.  
A   Partial Judges  
Defence counsel strongly believed the system was hampered by judge-partiality. Peter 
Williams QC has stated that on many occasions throughout his career, he had “sensed a 
favourable bias of judges towards the prosecution”.90 In describing Henry J, who presided 
over the first trial, Temm revealed that “amongst members of the Auckland Bar 
Association he had a reputation for being a prosecutors’ judge.”91  
Drawing from experience, Ryan observed that a judge could not be taken to have acted 
impartially simply because remarks appeared fair in print. For example the use of 
emphasis, tone of voice or facial expression can have the opposite effect on the jury to 
what has been written down.92 Ryan alleged that Perry J’s conduct conveyed to the jury 
that Thomas was most likely guilty and his Honour continually treated the defence 
unfairly.93  
B   Perry J 
Ryan recalled that in the course of cross-examining Inspector Hutton, Perry J interjected 
and accused Ryan of improper practice. The matter was resolved in private and his Honour 
concluded that Ryan was not in breach. However, Perry J did not remit this to the jury 
when they returned to court; no effort was made to restore the defence’s credibility and 
integrity which had been publicly undermined.94 On the other hand, when Morris 
suggested Thomas had sexually assaulted Jeannette, no comment was made by Perry J 
though the accusation had no evidential support.95  
C   Henry J’s Summing-up 
Henry J’s summing-up of the 1971 trial provoked accusations of judicial bias as his 
Honour appeared to overtly support the prosecution’s case. Yallop opined that Henry J’s 
summing-up better served as a closing speech for the prosecution as it ensured “only one 
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possible verdict could be reached” and was inherently “favourable to the Crown’s point of 
view.”96 For example, his Honour stated:97 
Mr Temm claimed first of all that the evidence did not prove that the axle was 
attached to Harvey Crewe’s body. Well, there was a very strong submission to 
you from the Crown that there were very good reasons for you to come to a 
conclusion that it was. 
In addition, Temm considered that Henry J only barely satisfied the duty to present both 
sides as he gave special attention to the prosecution’s case, and hardly any to the 
defence.98 Henry J reiterated all the important points raised by Morris, methodically 
reviewing the prosecution’s evidence. In comparison, the attention given to the case for the 
defence was inadequate. Henry J summarised the defence’s case in only five lines and 
simply asked the jury to remember the defence’s evidence.99 
The emphasis Henry J placed on the case against Thomas, relative to the lack of attention 
given to the defence case, implied that his Honour believed Thomas used his rifle to 
murder Harvey and Jeannette Crewe.100 In addition, it indicated that his Honour 
considered the wire and axle found on the bodies had originated from Thomas’ farm.101 
Ted Smith, a Pukekawa farmer sitting in the public gallery was shocked by how Henry J 
distorted and slanted the evidence towards a guilty verdict.102 The summing-up also 
inferred that any possibility exhibit 350 was planted was simply untenable:103 
...that would entail a visit to his farm and the search for and the finding of a 
spent shell to be planted by somebody whom we do not know anything at all, 
and again, the shell will not involve the accused unless the bullets found in the 
heads of Jeannette and Harvey Crewe were No. 8, the same as his, and had the 
same rifling marks as would be made by his rifle. How would an unknown 
person know that his (accused’s) rifle and spent ammunition from his farm 
would give that result? 
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His Honour qualified this statement with “please do not think I am suggesting it, but you 
may well think that any suggestion of the planting of a shell has little or no merit or 
validity.”104 Henry J included many of these escape clauses to ensure his Honour appeared 
impartial to the jury. The Court of Appeal in Waara v R restated the longstanding idea that 
judges are not barred from expressing a view on the facts, provided the jury is directed that 
it is not worth any particular weight.105 However, given the countless times Henry J 
expressed one-sided views and would sometimes weigh counsels’ arguments in favour of 
the prosecution,106 any of the qualifying clauses were likely inadequate to mitigate the 
influential effect of the strong inferences made by an authoritative figure of the court. 
Though perhaps unintentional, Henry J’s summing-up likely had the effect of conveying to 
the jury how to decide the case under the guise of neutrality.  
In June 1971 Temm appealed on grounds that Henry J failed to put the defence case 
adequately and the summing-up as a whole was partial and unfair.107 The Court of Appeal 
held there was no substance in the complaint and it was “trite law” that a judge need not 
address every contention advanced.108 This was reaffirmed in Ibbetson v R where the 
Court stipulated that judges do not need to devote equal amounts of time to the respective 
cases.109 However, there was and still is a requirement to ensure the summing-up is neutral 
and balanced in the sense of fairly and adequately imparting the salient points of each 
side.110 In the context of the excessive emphasis placed on the Crown’s case combined 
with the numerous suggestions made by Henry J, the summing-up had the effect of 
advocating the prosecution’s case and fell short of fairly representing the arguments in a 
neutral and balanced manner.  
An appeal against the second jury verdict brought by Ryan in July 1973 on grounds of 
unfair conduct by the prosecutor was also dismissed.111 The dismissal of this appeal is also 
anomalous when one considers the Court of Appeal’s reasoning below. 
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D   The Court of Appeal: 11 July 1973 
The appeal against the second verdict was on the basis of “unfair conduct by the crown 
prosecutor”.112 Ryan referred to statements made by Morris in his final address to the jury. 
One of Ryan’s arguments related to the prosecution’s suggestion that Thomas sexually 
assaulted Jeannette before killing her.113 This suggestion was purposely emotive, and 
unsupported by evidence heard by the jury during trial. In spite of this, the Court of Appeal 
held the prosecution did not exceed the bounds of propriety. The Court acknowledged that 
prosecutors must not struggle for a conviction; however, they qualified this with the notion 
that prosecutors are entitled to be as firm as the circumstances warrant in the interests of 
presenting a case “fairly and completely”.114  
The Court considered the inference made by Morris was warranted by the circumstances; 
Thomas’ past affection for Jeannette and his precarious financial position relative to the 
Crewes’ wealth were supposedly bases upon which Morris was entitled to suggest sexual 
assault.115 However, in view of the emotionally charged nature and seriousness of a sexual 
violation allegation, one would expect strong evidence would be required to support such 
an inference rather than factors that simply make it a mere possibility. Especially 
considering the potential effect it could have on the jury in coming to a verdict. 
Stranger yet, the Court sympathised with the prosecution’s interest in crafting a response 
to the question of motive. It appreciated that Morris would have anticipated Ryan would 
urge there was no motive to kill.116 Essentially, the Court gave the prosecution licence to 
fabricate a motive though none could be conclusively established. It seems more in step 
with the obligation to “present the case fairly and completely”117 to have Morris convey to 
the jury that no reasonable motive could be identified. 
E   Judicial Response to Criticism 
It is conceivable that the Courts’ reluctance to allow an appeal in 1973 was attributed to 
the desire to protect the justice system from denigration. In fact, one of the functions of the 
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judiciary is to maintain public confidence in the courts.118 If the authority of the courts is 
lowered in the eyes of the public, litigants would be deterred from bringing cases. In 2004, 
the New Zealand High Court in Solicitor-General v Smith reasoned that the courts can 
only effectively uphold the rule of law if they command the authority and respect of the 
public.119 However, laws against scandalising the court can only be justified when 
authority and respect is due; that is, if the judiciary is carrying out its function as an 
impartial and independent arbiter of justice. During the Thomas case, many judges blindly 
defended a corrupt system at the expense of an innocent man’s freedom.  
Exposed to widespread public criticism, members of the judiciary were impelled to speak 
out in defence of the criminal justice system. Sir Alfred North, former president of the 
Court of Appeal who heard the appeal against the first trial verdict in 1971, criticised the 
campaign for Thomas’ release as causing “incalculable harm” to the system.120 He further 
claimed that the system would “break down” if it could be subject to continued allegations 
of unfairness.121 Wild CJ, one of five judges in the 1975 Court of Appeal hearing, also 
considered Thomas a threat to the system. He made a public statement that if Thomas was 
granted a new trial after two guilty verdicts, the system would be brought into disrepute.122  
Booth alleged that the administration refused to examine matters submitted by himself and 
Dr Sprott. Rather than objectively considering whether his submissions had merit, the 
system would immediately cast them aside.123 Peter Williams QC identified that this 
perception of Thomas as a danger to the stability of the criminal justice system made it 
particularly difficult to attain an acquittal.124 The view seemed to be that any success 
accruing to Thomas would erode the public’s confidence in the courts; thus any attack on 
the system was rigorously repelled.  
At this point, it should be apparent that the close relationships that existed between various 
pillars of the criminal justice system reinforced the system’s flaws. The police worked 
closely with the prosecution as they shared a common interest in the conviction of the 
accused and protecting themselves from disrepute. The same goes for the judiciary which 
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appeared to be pro-prosecution and had a vested interest in ensuring public confidence in 
the administration of justice. The deficiencies of the system were self-sustaining as the 
pillars did not act as checks and balances upon one another; the desire to preserve public 
confidence rendered the appeal system virtually useless and without an impartial judiciary 
the defendant was vulnerable. The result was that when the system failed Thomas, there 
were no internal mechanisms available to remedy the situation or provide a deterrent to 
unseemly conduct. In reaction to public pressure,125 justice had to be restored through the 
involvement of Parliament and the Executive under the procedures of an inquisitorial 
system. 
VII   The Jury 
The Jury is a crucial component of the criminal justice system. While judges deal with the 
legal matters, members of the jury serve a fact finding function.126 The jurors in the 
Thomas trials did not have vested interests in ensuring one particular outcome; therefore, 
they should have been completely neutral and able to act as a safeguard in the system.  
Despite this, shortcomings emerged nonetheless. This section will examine the efficacy of 
the jury system by reviewing its operation in the Thomas case.  
A   The Efficacy of the Jury System 
In an unrelated case, Wild CJ stated that jury verdicts deserve the confidence of the 
public.127 In defence of the system, his Honour stated that the jury represents the whole of 
the community. In addition, the defence is given the power to challenge the composition of 
the jury to ensure impartiality, the jury hears all the evidence and a unanimous verdict 
safeguards a person from wrongful conviction. However, as the Thomas case revealed, this 
was not necessarily the case. 
1   Ability to hear all the Evidence 
As noted earlier, due to the selective use of facts and the way evidence was heavily angled 
by the prosecution, both juries were unable to hear all the evidence. Contrary to Wild CJ’s 
assertion, the two juries did not have in front of them all the evidence; an uninformed 
verdict does not deserve the confidence of the community. 
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2   The Jury Deliberations 
The notion that the requirement of unanimity acts as a safeguard against erroneous verdicts 
is swiftly discredited upon examining the jury deliberation of the second trial. The 
safeguard was futile as three of the jurors who were opposed to a guilty verdict were 
quickly persuaded to change their minds.128 It was revealed that the jury did not engage in 
careful deliberation and had come to a decision within a few minutes. The jurors simply 
decided to loiter in the jury room until they were satisfied they had taken longer than the 
first jury to return to the courtroom.129  
B   Advantages of the Prosecution in Relation to the Jury 
The defence was yet again at a disadvantage, only this time it was due to the influence the 
Crown exerted over the jury. The prosecution had the upper hand in vetting the jury list, 
the sequestration of jurors fuelled the development of a crown-jury relationship, and 
members of the jury were possibly not impartial. 
1   Vetting Jury Lists 
The jury system strives to ensure that the courts are provided with a panel that is both 
impartial and representative of the ordinary New Zealand citizen. However, because of 
three advantages the prosecution had in relation to the jury list, there was a real possibility 
that the Crown could shape the composition of the jury. While the defence and the 
prosecution both had the right to receive a copy of the list of potential jurors prior to the 
ballot, this vetting right was not equal.  
Firstly, the custom was that the jury list would be made available to both sides three 
working days prior to the trial. However, it was not until less than two working days 
before the second trial that the court registrar allowed Ryan to access a copy of the list.130 
This treatment of the defence team by members of the Department of Justice was allegedly 
not unusual.131 It was later unveiled that the prosecution had obtained an unpurged list six 
weeks prior to the second trial and a copy of the jury list 16 days before the trial.132 This 
meant the Crown had ample time to analyse the jury list and decide which persons to 
                                                          
128 Yallop, above n 6, at 273. 
129 At 273. 
130 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [454]. 
131 Ryan, above n 33, at 136. 
132 Report of the Royal Commission, above n 2, at [453]. 
22 
 
object to while the defence had a significantly shorter amount of time to look through the 
90 names.133 
Secondly, there was a disparity in resources. Unlike the prosecution, the defence did not 
have the entire police force on its side to facilitate the vetting process. The injustice was 
not limited to the fact the prosecution had access to more labour, but it also rested in the 
extent of information gathered. Williams noted that the defence was merely given the 
name, address and occupation of each juror, while the Crown abused its access to police 
facilities. Police officers were instructed to compile profiles for each potential juror 
containing extensive information. This included whether they were pro-police and 
anything that would cause them to be sympathetic towards Thomas.134 The Commission 
took the view that the thoroughness of the police checks were “excessive, improper and 
calculated to prejudice the fairness of the subsequent trial.”135 This feeds into the final 
advantage of the prosecution. 
Wild CJ was perhaps over optimistic in his belief the defence’s power to challenge jury 
selection was adequate to prevent jury partiality. Section 363 of the Crimes Act 1961 gave 
the Crown an unlimited right to stand jurors aside while Ryan only had six peremptory 
challenges pursuant to s 122 of the Juries Act 1908. The Commission recognised the 
significant problem posed by s 363.136 The excessive collation of information was 
considered prejudicial because under s 363 it was possible for the Crown to stand aside 
jurors until those favourable to the prosecution were called. Effectively, this meant that the 
Crown could select a partial jury. In fact, prior to the second Thomas trial, eight members 
of the jury had been noted as “strongly pro-police.”137  
Few protection mechanisms existed to guard against such an outcome and the ones that 
were available were of little use. Section 362 of the Crimes Act allowed parties to 
challenge the selection on grounds of partiality, fraud and wilful misconduct; however, this 
provision seldom assisted in the provision of an impartial jury.138 Section 363 allowed 
counsel to challenge the selection of jurors on the ground that they were not indifferent 
between the Crown and the accused. This right of challenge was not often used as a sound 
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basis for the objection was difficult to satisfy without prior intimate knowledge about the 
juror.139 The Commission opined that: 140 
“The right of the Crown Prosecutor to stand aside an unlimited number of 
jurors is in our view an anachronism which invites abuse; the Crown should 
have the same number of peremptory challenges as the Defence.” 
Section 363 was repealed in 1982 by the Juries Act 1981.141 
2   Crown-jury Relations 
The inequities were not limited to the Crown’s broad powers over the jury selection 
process; they extended to the relationship the jury had with counsel. A noticeable Crown-
jury relationship emerged during the second trial. There were two reasons for the 
development of a close relationship between the prosecution and the jury. Firstly, the 
Crown created or was given opportunities to have greater interaction with the jurors 
outside of court. Secondly, especially at the time, there was an innate tendency for 
laypeople to trust the Crown and its witnesses which included the police. In short, the 
jury’s predilection for the prosecution was driven by external as well as internal forces. 
(a)   External Forces 
Taking an abnormal route, Henry and Perry JJ both decided that sequestration was 
necessary to preserve a fair trial. Throughout both trials the respective juries were kept in 
isolation at the Auckland Station Hotel.142 It is possible that the judges’ orders were made 
with good intentions; the sequestration of jurors is a legitimate means of insulating jurors 
from influences likely to prejudice a fair trial. Sequestration was considered by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in 1995 in the case of Gisborne Herald v Solicitor-General. The 
Court recognised the “sequestration of jurors for the duration of trials has not been a 
practice in New Zealand” and that it would “add to the pressures on jurors and affect their 
ordinary lives.”143  
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Sequestering jurors was indeed very rare in the 1970s.144 While the defence objected to 
sequestration, the prosecution approved of the directive and even booked rooms at the 
hotel in advance.145 Studies have shown that keeping juries in isolation increases the risk 
of jurors developing feelings of resentment towards the accused.146 As a result, there is a 
real likelihood for jurors to identify with the prosecution.147 To make matters worse, the 
presence of police officers at the hotel meant the jurors were vulnerable to their influences. 
They would spend many hours in the company of the police who served as their escorts 
and carers.148 There is a real risk that this association subconsciously influences jurors;149 
Ryan believed that, in coming to a verdict, the second trial jury was influenced by feelings 
of friendship.150  
 
The Crown also actively tried to win the allegiance of the jurors. During the second trial 
there was a lunch gathering for the jury, the prosecutors and Crown witness Inspector 
Hutton at the Tuakau hotel. The defence was not invited.151 The police also allegedly took 
jurors out on a fishing expedition the weekend before the delivery of the verdict, and 
according to hotel staff they hosted various parties for the jurors at the Station Hotel.152 It 
is difficult to see how the jury’s verdict would not in some way be influenced by its 
relationship with those constituting the prosecution team. 
(b)   Internal Forces 
Another factor weighing against Thomas, was the inclination for laypeople at the time to 
place their trust in the police. Williams wrote that some jurors subconsciously harboured a 
desire to placate authority; such a desire is most likely residual from what is taught during 
early childhood.153 Ryan observed that New Zealand juries usually had faith in the 
integrity of the police force.154 Given that the police were always in close proximity to the 
jurors and possessed extensive information about each one of them, it is possible that the 
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desire to placate the police was also attributed to fear of police retribution. Either way, the 
public displayed an over-readiness to accept the testimony of police officers.155  
Police witnesses were given the benefit of the doubt, and this made it particularly easy for 
the prosecution to portray Thomas as a liar when he challenged police evidence during 
cross-examination. Antipathy towards the police in New Zealand society did not largely 
arise until after the Thomas trials. The case marked the beginning of a shift in the public’s 
perception of law enforcement, but widespread mistrust did not manifest until the display 
of police brutality during events tied to the 1981 Springbok Tour.156 At the time of the 
second trial, while there were many who believed in Thomas’ innocence, there was still a 
large portion of the public who found allegations of police impropriety simply 
unfathomable.157  
3   A partial Jury 
Many factors are indicative of a partial jury. The most prominent of which is where a 
member of the jury has personal connection with a party or a witness.158 Bob Rock was the 
foreman of the second jury and was personally acquainted with one of the Crown 
witnesses. Rock was in the navy with Detective Sergeant Hughes, who gave evidence in 
the second trial; they had known each other for years.159  
The court registrar considered this was not prejudicial to Thomas’ right to a fair trial and 
dismissed it without alerting the defence to this information.160 This was problematic as 
Ryan was not given the opportunity to dispute the foreman’s continued participation in 
deliberations. The Commission was critical of this omission and considered that it was 
enough on its own to justify describing the second trial as a miscarriage of justice.161 The 
administration made no attempt to investigate the nature and extent to which Rock was 
affected by his relationship with the witness. As the person chairing the jury, there was 
also a possibility that he could influence other jurors. The existence of a partial jury is 
inherently unfair and not representative of the whole community.162 Henry J agreed that 
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the jury should have been dismissed in the second trial and a re-trial should have been 
ordered.163 
VIII   Conclusion 
The Arthur Allan Thomas case saw public trust in New Zealand’s criminal justice system 
diminish dramatically. The conduct of actors within the courts inhibited the fair 
administration justice and as a result exposed themselves to profound derision. For 
example, the trials revealed the prosecution’s total lack of regard for its duty to the courts. 
The struggle for a conviction was discernible from the way the prosecution employed 
unfair tactics, attempted to fabricate evidence about exhibit 350 and destroyed exhibits 
while cognisant of their value to the defence. To make matters worse the prosecution was 
supported by the police force with whom they shared a common interest: the preservation 
of their reputations which had been undermined by the extensive litigation. The defence 
did not have this resource advantage. By breaching disclosure rules, the prosecution and 
the police successfully presented a set of facts tailored to the detriment of the defendant. 
Justice was ostensibly not a priority for the prosecution and the police. 
The case also unveiled the potential for members of the judiciary to, in some cases, 
unfairly favour the prosecution. In particular, Henry J’s summing-up to the first jury 
attracted great controversy. Even accounting for the distressingly wide discretion afforded 
to judges in this aspect of the trial,164 the summing-up fell short of constituting a fair and 
adequate representation of the respective cases. The 1973 Court of Appeal decision also 
indicated a tendency to favour the prosecution as the Court openly sympathised with the 
prosecution’s desire to fabricate a motive. The judiciary’s devotion to defending and 
maintaining the verdict was also disconcerting as it rendered the appeals process virtually 
useless. Instead of addressing the deficiencies in the system Wild CJ and Sir Alfred North 
were critical of Thomas’ supporters and adamantly defended the system. 
The jury, supposedly composed of neutral laypeople, ought to have guarded against the 
potential for the prosecution and judiciary’s interests to affect the outcome; however, the 
jury was not immune to the Crown’s influences. As a result of the prosecution’s control 
over jury selection, the relationship between the jury foreman and a Crown witness, and 
the development of favourable crown-jury relations during the second trial, the resulting 
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jury was not impartial. It did not represent the values of the whole community. In addition, 
the prosecution’s selective presentation of facts prevented the jury from making an 
informed decision. The remaining safeguard yet to be exhausted existed outside of the 
criminal justice system. Had it not been for the intervention of the Executive, Thomas 
would not have been freed in 1979. 
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